It is clear in that passage that what Wittgenstein is attempting to understand is how we learn the meaning of a mental term like “pain.” The traditional idea is that we learn the meanings of terms like “pain” by singling out a kind of experience in our mind’s eye and then having that experience be the thing that our term “pain” refers to. Fairly straightforwardly. The correct answer is: an umbrella. But I have presented the weaker claim that M and B are correlated since the weaker claim is all that is needed to support the inference to other minds. The Traditional Problem of Mind and Body - The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds - Russell, Ryle and Armstrong. Russell thinks it is perfectly rational to assume, based on the correlation, M → B in my own case, that the same thing holds for others, based on the strength of analogy between our intelligent behaviors, which are very similar. What might the skeptic say in response to this reasoning? This isn’t to say, of course, that there isn’t a complex mechanism (the brain) that is causing all of these intelligent behaviors. The beetle is simply a way of referring to an individual’s conscious thoughts and sensations. This figure depicts the analogy in Russell’s analogical argument. ". For example, if the first Michigander I met owned a canoe and based on that one Michigander I asserted, “All Michiganders own canoes,” then that would be a hasty generalization. And if we actually think of how the generalization works, it is a bad generalization—it is a hasty generalization. Or, when Grace puts my king in check with her queen and then says “check,” I cannot observe the conscious thoughts that she has when she does this, but I do know that when I do similar things (that is, when I put others into “check” in a game of chess), those behaviors are correlated with a series of conscious thoughts. People might be talking intelligently about their beetles/thoughts even if there really aren’t any beetles/thoughts. So the “Cartesian view of mind” is a just a way of referring to the concept of the mind that Descartes held. Pojman – The Mind-Body Problem – As quoted, shortened, and semi-reorganized (not original content) Hospers: The problem of other minds; Russell: The argument from analogy for other minds; The Constant Nature of Synthetic A Priori Knowledge; Descartes: Meditation II; … Wittgenstein uses a metaphor of a “beetle in a box.” What are the beetle and the box metaphors for? I do not see how Russell can answer the above objection. And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? The neurons do what they do in causing the behaviors; there just isn’t any conscious experience connected with the functioning of those mechanisms. And since we have noted that sometimes the very same intelligent behaviors could be caused by things without minds (for example, computer programs), we cannot rule out that in the case of other people the same sort of thing is occurring—their speech and behavior is caused by ingenuously designed, but ultimately mindless, mechanisms. Because science has shown that there are no other minds b. That is, such a machine would behave as if it were thinking, but it wouldn’t really be thinking because it was really nothing other than an ingenuously designed mechanism that behaved in a way that was indistinguishable from things (like humans) that can truly think. But it seems that this is exactly what the behaviorist is saying. Because the only way to infer the existence of other minds is to use some particular religious worldview, c. Because nothing in physics alone can tell us whether other minds exist, d. Because additional postulates make the analogical reasoning stronger. It might even be the case that a person had no experience at all—no beetle in their box. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. Lecture 21: The Mind-Body Distinction III - Russell on Other Minds . Rather, what drives their intelligent behavior is nothing other than an ingenuous mechanism. The mind is not a concrete particular object, Ryle thinks, but a kind of abstract object, like “average taxpayer.” “Mind” is simply a shorthand way of referring to a range of different mental terms that themselves designate various types of intelligent behaviors. We each experience our own minds directly, from ‘within’. One way of seeing that they are is by considering blindsight patients. We have no doubt that humans can feel pleasure and pain, can remember and reason.